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Abstract
This paper examines the impartiality of referee decision making when applying 
Law 7 of FIFA’s Laws of the Game. We investigate decision making relating to 
the allocation of additional time for 1,515 English Premier League matches 
from 2009 to 2013. The research finds no evidence of home favoritism and lim-
ited evidence of a bias towards “big” clubs, a phenomenon commonly known 
as Fergie Time. However, an examination of close matches finds Fergie Time is 
not present, suggesting its ability to alter tight matches is negligible.
Keywords: additional time, referee decision making, favoritism
Introduction
This paper examines the impartiality of English Premier League (EPL) referees when 
allocating additional time at the end of EPL matches. Specifically, we question whether 
favoritism exists towards “big” clubs, as defined by their financial and football per-
formance, in the allocation of second-half additional time over 1,515 EPL matches 
from August 2009 to May 2013. In recent years referee decision making has been ex-
plored from a number of angles. Empirical studies have examined physiological ef-
fects (Helsen & Bultynck, 2004), psychological aspects (Jones et al., 2002), crowd and 
stadium influences (Nevill, Balmer, & Williams, 2002), and principal-agent dynamics 
(Sutter & Kocher, 2004). We do not intend to explain the causal effects of favoritism as 
discussed in previous research; instead, the aim of this paper is to determine if referees 
displayed home favoritism or a bias towards big clubs over the course of four seasons. 
The paper is the first to test Fergie Time, an English concept, in the EPL. It is also the 
first to define both a “big” club and “small” club using the dual criterion of football 
success and financial strength. 
This study is motivated by three factors. First, while extensive research has been con-
ducted into home favoritism, there is limited research that considers big club favorit-
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ism. Studying big club favoritism in football can provide insight to a practice that is 
relevant to many organizational contexts where principals commonly have differential 
standings. As is often the case with sport, novel field data of individual decision mak-
ing (commonly inaccessible in an organizational context) can be collected. Further-
more, addressing the status of different principals and asking whether favoritism is 
shown toward specific clubs can produce important findings concerning the effects of 
reputation on agent decision making, a practice previously identified as significantly 
influencing football referees in an experimental setting (Jones, Paull, & Erskine, 2002). 
The second motivation for this study derives from extensive media coverage of the 
research question. This paper tests a popular claim propagated by the media and pro-
vides empirical answers to whether the widespread perception of Fergie Time is factual 
or a myth. This follows a similar theme to that of Lenten (2012) and Fort and Win-
free (2013). Many media outlets have made explicit claims that EPL referees allocate 
different amounts of additional time when faced with different incentive structures.1 
Favoritism to one principal in this context was dubbed Fergie Time, in reference to the 
former Manchester United manager Sir Alex Ferguson, who memorably sought greater 
amounts of additional time at the end of matches during his tenure from 1986 to 2013. 
When considered abstractly, Fergie Time suggests that certain principals are awarded 
excessive additional time, providing them an opportunity to change the outcome of a 
match. The existence of Fergie Time can be considered a form of favoritism toward one 
principal participating in a football match that is a product of an agent’s discretion. 
A third reason for this study is to enhance our understanding of favoritism in sport. 
Pollard’s (2008) reiteration of the sentiment originally expressed in Pollard (1986) is in-
dicative of the need for further research in this domain. Despite more than two decades 
passing, he argues that “there is still much to be learnt about the complex mechanisms 
that cause home advantage, both in soccer and other sports” (Pollard, 2008, p. 13). In 
light of this, we forward a hypothesis that addresses these complex mechanisms and 
test for systematic referee impartiality in a similar tradition to previous football favor-
itism research (Boyko, Boyko, & Boyko, 2007; Buraimo, Forrest, & Simmons, 2010; 
Dawson & Dobson, 2010; Dawson, Dobson, Goddard, & Wilson, 2007; Garicano, 
Palacios-Huerta, & Prendergast, 2005; Sutter & Kocher, 2004). This paper, however, is 
unique as we focus not just on home advantage but on a club size regardless of match 
venue. 
Background
Although the idea of favorably allocating additional time to particular clubs can be 
considered unjust, the introduction of additional time to account for stoppages in play 
was established to ensure a sense of justice. A match in 1891 involving English clubs 
Aston Villa and Stoke City was the catalyst for this. Prior to this fixture, all matches 
had been 90 minutes in duration—consisting of two 45-minute halves. Once the sec-
ond 45 minutes had elapsed the match immediately ended. In this match, however, 
Aston Villa was leading 1–0 with two minutes remaining when Stoke was awarded 
a penalty kick. Infuriated by the referee’s decision, the Aston Villa goalkeeper kicked 
the only football out of the stadium. Unfortunately for Stoke, the football could not be 
retrieved in time. The remaining two minutes of playing time elapsed, resulting in a 
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victory for Aston Villa. As a consequence of these events the Football Association (FA) 
introduced the concept of additional time to allow referees to allocate more time at the 
end of each half of a match, when deemed appropriate, for stoppages judged excessive 
or unnecessary (Nawrat & Hutchings, 1998). Further transparency to the allocation of 
additional time occurred at the 1998 World Cup in France when FIFA introduced the 
use of an electronic board to display the minimum amount of time left in a match at 
the end of each half. Both the original decision to allocate additional time and the use 
of electronic boards to disclose information were introduced to promote fairness and 
transparency in the sport. 
It is important to note that the decision of how much additional time to allocate is at 
the discretion of the match referee alone. Minimal explicit direction is given by foot-
ball authorities regarding how to calculate the amount of additional time at the end of 
each half. An incremental time allowance usually applies to compensate for excessive 
stoppages. Law 7 – The Duration of the Match of FIFA’s Laws of the Game outlines the 
rules associated with additional time and states that:
“Many stoppages in play are entirely natural (e.g., throw-ins, goal kicks). An al-
lowance is to be made only when these delays are excessive. The fourth official in-
dicates the minimum additional time decided by the referee at the end of the final 
minute of each period of play. The announcement of the additional time does not 
indicate the exact amount of time left in the match. The time may be increased if 
the referee considers it appropriate but never reduced. The referee must not com-
pensate for a timekeeping error during the first half by increasing or reducing the 
length of the second half.” (FIFA, 2014, p. 104)
Further direction regarding Law 7 is provided in the Laws of the Game and states 
that the amount of additional time required is at the discretion of the referee and an 
allowance is only made for time lost due to “substitutions, the assessment of injury to 
players, removal of injured players from the field of play for treatment, wasting time 
[or] any other cause” (FIFA, 2014, p. 29). Natural stoppages such as offside decisions, 
free-kicks, thrown-ins, and the restarting of play from a goal kick are not cited in the 
rules as reasons to allocate additional time. 
Referee Decision Making
Referee decision making is now being examined from a variety of perspectives. Much 
of the previous work into this area has been motivated by the perception that favorit-
ism exists within sport, and that a referee can be influenced by a range of factors related 
to this. Although favoritism in sports is general, the causes and occurrences of these 
advantages are highly variable both between and within sports.2 
As the pace of professional football increased over the past 20 years, the task of offici-
ating has become increasingly challenging and has been matched by dramatic changes 
in the way referees are trained (Nevill, Webb, & Watts, 2013). This challenge has been 
intensified by technological improvements, such as goal-line video analysis, subject-
ing referees’ decision making to greater scrutiny. Referees are increasingly required 
to demonstrate enhanced physical, technical, and psychological strengths in order to 
effectively administer the rules of the game (De Oliveira, Orbetelli, & De Barros Neto, 
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2011; Helsen & Bultynck, 2004; Palacios-Huerta, 2014). A growing body of research 
has considered whether these demands have led to systematic biases in referees’ deci-
sion making, with particular focus on whether the “home-away” dynamic causes home 
team favoritism (Buraimo et al., 2010; Clarke & Norman, 1995; Nevill et al., 2002; Reil-
ly & Witt, 2013; Scoppa, 2008). 
Investigations into home favoritism have involved studying travel effects (Pollard 
& Pollard, 2005), psychological factors (Jones et al., 2002), territorial factors (Pollard, 
2006; Pollard & Pollard, 2005), crowd and stadium effects (Nevill et al., 2002), and offi-
ciating favoritism (Boyko et al., 2007; Sutter & Kocher, 2004). Both crowd and stadium 
effects and referee favoritism are now explored further. 
Of the factors cited, the issue of crowd and stadium effects has been thoroughly 
examined. Nevill, Newell, and Gale (1996) address crowd size in the context of En-
glish and Scottish football and find that a higher percentage of home wins is positively 
correlated with larger attendances. Home clubs are less likely to be penalized for am-
biguous tackles in the presence of greater supporter intensity (Nevill et al., 2002) and 
receive fewer yellow and red cards the closer spectators are to the pitch (Buraimo et 
al., 2010). Matches played in stadiums with a running track act as a deterrent to home 
bias, with greater impartiality in decision making prevalent among referees (Scoppa, 
2008). Notably, recent evidence suggests that home advantage in football is becoming 
less likely in smaller stadiums and that improved training for referees3 may not immu-
nize their decision making completely from environmental factors (Nevill et al., 2013). 
A second causal factor that has been subject to significant study is referee decision 
making. Sutter and Kocher (2004) investigate the behavior of referees and find a sys-
tematic bias toward home teams that are significantly more likely to be awarded penal-
ty kicks. An examination of both the EPL and five seasons of European football found 
that referees favor home teams when issuing yellow and red cards, with visiting teams 
more likely to be punished by referees (Dawson et al., 2007; Dawson & Dobson, 2010). 
Boyko et al., (2007) confirm this officiating bias by examining 5,244 EPL matches in-
volving 50 referees. They find that instances of home bias differ between individual 
referees, with some more biased than others. Factors such as crowd noise and density 
are proposed as possible explanations for this difference. 
A number of studies address the amount of additional time allocated by referees at 
the end of a match. Sutter and Kocher (2004) find a systematic bias in the Bundesli-
ga, with home teams receiving favorable treatment (e.g., playing less time when re-
quired, when winning, and playing more time when drawing and losing). Research by 
Dohmen (2008) supports these results and finds that more additional time is played 
in the Bundesliga when home spectators are closer to the field of play. Garicano et al., 
(2005) apply a similar analysis to Spain’s La Liga and confirm the existence of a system-
atic advantage in favor of home teams. The results of Garicano et al., (2005) indicated 
that referees shorten matches with close scores in La Liga in which the home team is 
winning, and extend close matches in which the home team is losing. Scoppa (2008) 
examines the allocation of additional time by referees in Seria A and confirms a bias 
in favor of home teams, with significantly more time played if the home team is losing 
at the end of 90 minutes across two seasons in Seria A. Most recently, Riedl, Strauss, 
Heuer, and Rubner (2015) examine 10 seasons of data from the Bundesliga and confirm 
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the presence of favoritism in the allocation of additional time when one team leads 
another, when compared to a tie game. The results of these papers will be discussed in 
light of the results of this work in the discussion section. 
Empirical Framework and Descriptive Statistics
To investigate whether EPL referees display favoritism towards certain clubs when 
applying Law 7 at the end of each match we collected data for the EPL from August 
2009 to May 2013. May 2013 is used as the end point, as it coincides with the retirement 
of Sir Alex Ferguson. The dataset includes four complete EPL seasons. Two hypotheses 
are tested. The first is the incidence of home favoritism in the allocation of additional 
time. The second is the presence of “big” club favoritism (Fergie Time) in the allocation 
of additional time. To test the second hypothesis, a classification system is required to 
differentiate between clubs. Big clubs are defined by the following criteria:
1. The club must appear in the list of top 20 clubs worldwide by revenue generation 
  in the Deloitte Football Money League Report for every year under analysis  
 (2009–2013).4
2. The club must have participated in the Group Stages of the UEFA Champions  
 League and won a major domestic competition in the past decade.5 
Fulfilling a dual criterion ensures that big clubs are defined not only by their relative 
financial performance but also by their success on the field of play and presence in the 
elite club competition in Europe. While these two criteria hold a causal relationship, 
we believe it is important to judge a club’s size as a consequence of both its commercial 
and sporting exploits. This classification system has the added benefit of being flexible 
and can be applied to alternative European leagues to test the second hypothesis of Fer-
gie Time. Six EPL clubs meet this criterion and are hereafter known as big clubs. They 
are Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool, Manchester City, Manchester United, and Tottenham 
Hotspur. These clubs are not just defined as “big” for the sample period considered, 
but are also the only clubs to fulfil this criteria in any season from 2003 to 2016. This 
ensures that the empirical results are not biased by the four seasons examined, as the 
clubs defined as big fulfill the dual criteria over an extended 14-year period. The re-
maining 22 clubs that appeared in the EPL between August 2009 and May 2013 are 
hereafter referred to as small clubs.6,7 
The dataset includes 1,515 EPL matches that took place between August 2009 and 
May 2013 and is available from the respected British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 
Data is inaccessible for five matches during the sample period as the BBC did not re-
port the number of seconds of additional time played. Data is collected for each indi-
vidual match on the total number of seconds of additional time played at the end of 
the second half, the venue and score at the end of 90 minutes of play, the number of 
goals between the teams at the end of 90 minutes of play (margin), games in which a 
single goal can alter the outcome of a match (close matches), the total number of goals, 
yellow cards, second yellow cards and red cards in the second half of each match, the 
number of serious injuries8 in the second half of each match, and the number of years 
each match referee has been officiating in the EPL. It was neither possible nor neces-
sary to control for all stoppages in each match. For example, it is not required to control 
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for the total number of fouls, throw-ins, corner-kicks, or offside decisions as these are 
considered “natural” stoppages. Law 7 states that additional time is only required when 
a stoppage is “excessive.” 
Over the four seasons, the home team led 44.3% of matches entering additional time 
while the away team led 27.3% of the time. In 28.4% of EPL matches from 2009 to 2013, 
the score was tied at the end of 90 minutes of play. In 65% of matches (987 of 1,515) the 
match was either tied or had just one goal separating the teams as the match entered 
second-half additional time. Nearly 7% of matches experienced a change in outcome 
between the start and end of second-half additional time (e.g., a goal scored in ad-
ditional time that changed the outcome from a draw to a home win or from a home 
loss to a draw, etc.). Additional descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Table 2 
tabulates the mean number of seconds of additional time played across the 1,515 EPL 
matches. The data is presented for the home team with the three possible outcomes as 
the match enters second-half additional time. It is of note that these descriptive statis-
tics are subject to little variation over the sample period. 
Table 1. EPL 2009–2013 Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Additional Time (seconds) 265 79 78 772
Goals per Match 2.79 1.71 0 10
Margin after 90 minutes 1.32 1.26 0 8
Close Matches 0.65 0.48 0 1
Substitutions 5.25 0.91 0 6
Yellow Cards 3.15 1.86 0 12
Red Cards 0.16 0.42 0 3
Serious Injury 0.02 0.15 0 1
Referee Experience (Years) 5.94 3.17 0 11
Table 2. Additional Time Means in Seconds
Home Team Winning Drawing Losing
1. All Games 263.09 267.02 267.36
2. Big Clubs 253.54 296.97 294.82
3. Small Clubs 259.72 269.23 264.78
4. Big Clubs vs. Small Club 245.43 298.62 308.03
5. Big Club vs. Big Club 291.28 297.2 282.1
6. Small Clubs vs. Big Club 266.4 267.46 247.84
7. Small Clubs vs. Small Club 256.38 269.21 279.89
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Empirical Results
Table 3 presents a club fixed-effects regression for the 1,515 EPL games. The amount of 
additional time in seconds is used as the dependent variable. As expected, many of the 
independent variables included to explain the determinants of additional time prove 
to be statistically significant. The number of second-half goals, close matches, substi-
tutions, yellow cards, red cards, and serious injuries all positively impact the amount 
of additional time across all three regressions. The number of goals between the teams 
(margin) is statistically significant across all regressions and negatively affects the 
amount of additional time. Regression (1) presents results on home club favoritism 
in the allocation of additional time. As indicated by the descriptive statistics in Table 
1, no such advantage exists in the EPL from 2009 to 2013 when considering all 1,515 
matches. Significantly more additional time is played, regardless of whether the home 
team is winning or losing, when compared to a drawn game. This result confirms the 
impartiality of match referees when allocating additional time but does suggest that 
referees add significantly more additional time when the score is non-neutral, regard-
less of which team is winning. 
Regression (2) isolates home matches involving the six big clubs and compares these 
to all other matches in the sample. Dummy variables are included for big clubs when 
winning, drawing, and losing at home. No significant differences are found for big clubs 
when winning or losing at home across all regressions, confirming referee impartiality. 
Regression (3) considers the opposite relationship and examines matches when small 
clubs are at home. Unlike Regression (2), small clubs do receive significantly more 
additional time when both winning and losing at home compared to a drawn match at 
the end of 90 minutes. However, similar to Regression (1), non-neutral matches at the 
end of 90 minutes of play are subject to significantly more additional time. 
Table 3. The Determinants of Additional Time in the EPL 2009–2013 
Regression (1) (2) (3)
Constant 157.80*** 160.28*** 157.70***
(7.56) (8.24) (7.85)
Goals 7.05*** 6.50*** 6.94***
(0.93) (0.90) (0.94)
Margin -17.70*** -11.18*** -16.79***
(2.47) (2.73) (2.57)
Close Matches 24.11*** 27.42*** 24.70***
(4.82) (5.12) (4.89)
Substitutions 9.37*** 10.09*** 9.79***
(1.58) (1.58) (1.58)
Yellow Cards 7.81*** 8.00*** 7.75***
(0.89) (0.87) (0.87)
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Table 3. (Cont.) The Determinants of Additional Time in the EPL 2009–2013 
Regression (1) (2) (3)
Red Cards 12.38** 12.78** 12.93**
(3.72) (3.87) (3.85)
Serious Injury 271.03*** 271.06*** 270.70***
(21.95) (21.57) (21.59)
Referee Experience -0.45 -0.44 -0.37
(0.52) (0.50) (0.52)
Home Winning 19.85***
(4.59)
Home Draw -
Home Losing 25.31***
(4.50)
Big Club Winning -5.31
(6.74)
Big Club Drawing -
Big Club Losing 11.91
(8.48)
Small Club Winning 24.32***
(5.49)
Small Club Drawing -
Small Club Losing 25.87***
(5.35)
N 1,515 1,515 1,515
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
VIF, Uncentered 5.41 4.67 4.75
R² Overall 0.446 0.437 0.428
Statistically significant: ***at 0.1% level; **at 1% level; *at 5% level.
† Results include club-fixed effects and are presented with robust standard errors. 
†† The log of the dependent variable produces results that do not differ statistically 
from those presented and demonstrate robustness in the dependent variable.
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Regressions (1), (2), and (3) require further examination. In order to check the ro-
bustness of these results and the possible presence of Fergie Time, which fundamentally 
addresses disparities between big and small clubs, the four possible match scenarios 
must be considered: big club versus big club, big club versus small club, small club 
versus big club, and small club versus small club. The fixed-effects results are presented 
in Table 4. In each regression the original dataset is restricted so that the four match 
scenarios can be tested individually and confirm the robustness of the first set of re-
gressions. 
Regression (4) presents results for matches played between Arsenal, Chelsea, Liv-
erpool, Manchester City, Manchester United, and Tottenham Hotspur. The margin, 
yellow cards, and the serious injuries are reported as statistically significant, explaining 
the amount of additional time. The home team also plays significantly more additional 
time, whether winning or losing, when compared to a drawn match. Regression (5) 
considers big clubs when at home to small clubs only. Big clubs do not play more addi-
tional time whether they are winning or losing at home to small clubs, supporting the 
referee impartiality found in earlier regressions. Regression (6) examines the opposite 
of Regression (5) and considers matches between big clubs and small clubs when the 
latter is at home. Unlike big clubs, small clubs play significantly more time (over half a 
minute; p < 0.007) when winning against a big club at home, and is evidence of Fergie 
Time. Regression (7) considers matches only involving small clubs. Significantly more 
additional time is played when the home team is winning and losing at the end of 90 
minutes when compared to a tied match between two small teams. 
It could be argued interpreting Regressions (6) as evidence of Fergie Time is prema-
ture and that these results can be explained by time-wasting tactics or increased foul 
play by small clubs. The following, however, should be noted. There is no evidence 
(other than anecdotal) to suggest small clubs increase their rate of foul play when win-
ning at home or away to big clubs. Nor is there any evidence (again other than anec-
dotal) that small clubs increase their rate of foul play as a match progresses. In order 
to account for this argument, interaction variables are created between the number of 
yellow cards in each match, a proximate measure of foul play, and the match outcome 
at the beginning of additional time (e.g., big club winning, big club losing, small club 
winning, etc.). In all instances, the interaction variable is not statistically significant.
Table 4. The Determinants of Additional Time—Club Size 2009–2013 
Regression (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant 267.34*** 152.51*** 134.42*** 160.48***
(12.27) (21.46) (15.96) (12.21)
Goals 2.50 8.35** 6.33** 8.29***
(2.52) (1.75) (2.23) (1.84)
Margin -42.91* -16.89** -14.85*** -15.18***
(14.43) (3.40) (3.98) (3.73)
Close Matches -14.60 20.19 30.11*** 22.25***
(18.56) (11.07) (6.89) (5.60)
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Table 4. (Cont.) The Determinants of Additional Time—Club Size 2009–2013 
Regression (4) (5) (6) (7)
Substitutions 7.11 11.53* 12.18*** 22.25***
(7.50) (4.05) (2.80) (5.60)
Yellow Cards 9.21** 6.79** 8.01*** 7.28***
(2.85) (1.42) (1.36) (1.23)
Red Cards 17.5 25.35** 18.51 4.34
(7.56) (8.21) (9.80) (5.38)
Serious Injury 274.62*** 315.00** 215.85** 260.24***
(38.42) (53.40) (63.58) (18.04)
Referee Experience -6.86 2.35 -0.85 -1.14*
(3.44) (1.01) (0.67) (0.47)
Big vs. Big Win 53.93**
(13.04)
Big vs. Big Draw -
Big vs. Big Loss 52.18*
(19.96)
Big vs. Small Win -10.50
(7.23)
Big vs. Small Draw -
Big vs. Small Loss 17.49
(12.72)
Small vs. Big Win 27.32**
(9.09)
Small vs. Big Draw -
Small vs. Big Loss 18.52
(10.15)
Small vs. Small Win 17.42***
(6.54)
Small vs. Small 
Draw
-
Small vs. Small Loss 29.91***
(6.88)
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Additionally, the use of the multi-ball system at most EPL matches allows for the im-
mediate resumption of play. This has dramatically limited opportunities for time-wast-
ing and diminishes the likelihood that the differences in additional time can be ex-
plained by time-wasting tactics. 
A second interaction variable between a referee’s years of experience officiating in 
the EPL, for all 20 referees in the sample, and the match outcome entering additional 
time is also created. In all instances no statistically significant results are found. This 
shows that more (or less) experience in the EPL does not alter a referee’s decision when 
deciding how much additional time to allocate. While the regressions presented in Ta-
bles 3 and 4 indicate the existence of Fergie Time in limited circumstance for the games 
examined, an important question remains: does it actually matter? Additional time at 
the end of a match is important only insofar as it can help alter the outcome. While 
there are instances of teams scoring two or more goals in additional time—the 1999 
Champions League Final between Manchester United and Bayern Munich being one 
of the most high profile examples—this scenario is very much an exception. Further 
regression analysis is conducted on the EPL between August 2009 and May 2013 in 
matches that were tied or those in which just one goal separated the teams entering sec-
ond-half additional time (close matches). This analysis establishes if home advantage 
or Fergie Time exists in close games, and provides a method to analyze the sensitivity 
for the results presented in Tables 3 and 4. The results of these regressions are presented 
in Tables 5 and 6.
Regression (8) considers home advantage for games with one goal or less between 
teams. Regressions (9) and (10) examine home advantage for big clubs and small clubs, 
respectively. Table 5 finds no evidence of home advantage for the 985 games exam-
ined from 2009 to 2013, confirming the results presented in Table 3. The number of 
goals, substitutions, yellow and red cards, and serious injuries all remain statistically 
significant across the three regressions. Furthermore, non-neutral matches entering 
additional time are not subject to significantly more additional time. An analysis of 
both big clubs (9) and small clubs (10) reports no significant effects, indicating that 
no referee bias is present. In order to investigate this further, Table 6 provides a break-
down of close matches into the same four scenarios presented in Table 4 and explores 
the possibility of Fergie Time in the various match scenarios. Similar to Regressions (4) 
Table 4. (Cont.) The Determinants of Additional Time—Club Size 2009–2013 
Regression (4) (5) (6) (7)
N 118 336 336 725
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
VIF, Uncentered 8.24 4.97 5.68 5.64
R² 0.542 0.555 0.395 0.416
Statistically significant: ***at 0.1% level; **at 1% level; *at 5% level.
† Results include club-fixed effects and are presented with robust standard errors. 
†† The log of the dependent variable produces results that do not differ statistically 
from those presented and demonstrate robustness in the dependent variable.
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Table 5. Determinants of Additional Time—Close Matches 2009–2013
Regression (8) (9) (10)
Constant 173.67*** 172.32*** 173.57***
(9.32) (9.38) (9.36)
Goals 6.99 7.00*** 7.03***
(1.26) (1.23) (1.22)
Margin 13.78 9.89 1.41
(13.23) (5.30) (6.52)
Substitutions 10.31*** 10.55*** 10.23***
(1.95) (1.91) (1.94)
Yellow Cards 8.17*** 8.14*** 8.18***
(1.14) (1.13) (1.14)
Red Cards 17.24** 17.62** 16.95**
(5.17) (5.13) (5.03)
Serious Injury 247.63*** 247.71*** 247.32***
(21.72) (21.51) (21.54)
Referee Experience -0.33 -0.24 -0.31
(0.52) (0.53) (0.53)
Home Winning -11.50
(12.12)
Home Draw –
Home Losing -2.45
(13.70)
Big Club Winning -17.03
(8.39)
Big Club Drawing –
Big Club Losing -11.16
(13.95)
Small Club Winning 3.61
(7.16)
Small Club Drawing –
and (5), Regressions (11) and (12) consider the close matches in the sample. Again no 
evidence of Fergie Time is found in close games when a big club is winning or losing at 
home to either another big club or a small club. This is consistent with earlier findings. 
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Table 5. (Cont.) Determinants of Additional Time—Close Matches 2009–2013
Regression (8) (9) (10)
Small Club Losing 11.61
(7.71)
N 985 985 985
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
VIF, Uncentered 5.99 3.06 4.75
R² 0.370 0.363 0.352
Statistically significant: ***at 0.1% level; **at 1% level; *at 5% level.
† Results include club-fixed effects and are presented with robust standard errors. 
†† The log of the dependent variable produces results that do not differ statistically 
from those presented and demonstrate robustness in the dependent variable.
Table 6. Determinants of Additional Time—Close Matches and Club Size
Regression (11) (12) (13) (14)
Constant 252.26*** 149.22*** 156.60*** 168.49***
(39.07) (20.62) (23.95) (13.22)
Goals 6.17 8.47* 4.96 8.57***
(2.74) (3.04) (2.42) (2.32)
Margin -14.00 5.76 -14.70 22.39
(73.13) (36.90) (25.96) (16.12)
Substitutions 4.49 16.54* 14.57** 10.65***
(7.95) (5.98) (4.10) (2.37)
Yellow Cards 11.12 5.84* 9.07*** 7.58***
(4.64) (1.92) (1.75) (1.62)
Red Cards 27.39 32.86** 21.72 9.46
(14.35) (8.09) (13.30) (6.52)
Serious Injury 265.13** 272.32** 179.74** 249.77***
(59.58) (60.31) (70.13) (17.45)
Referee Experience -7.59* 2.51 -1.46 -0.58
(2.58) (1.34) (1.02) (0.64)
Big vs. Big Win 28.02
(64.41)
Big vs. Big Draw –
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Regression (13) considers close games in the sub-sample where evidence of Fergie 
Time is found (Regression [6]). Considering only close games, we find no evidence of 
Fergie Time present when small clubs are winning at home to big clubs. Regression (14) 
indicates small clubs receive significantly more additional time when losing at home 
to other small clubs. While not evidence of Fergie Time, Regression (14) does suggest 
Table 6. (Cont.) Determinants of Additional Time—Close Matches and Club Size
Regression (11) (12) (13) (14)
Big vs. Big Loss 21.12
(71.29)
Big vs. Small Win -30.45
(32.52)
Big vs. Small Draw -
Big vs. Small Loss -11.93
(41.92)
Small vs. Big Win 24.02
(20.25)
Small vs. Big Draw –
Small vs. Big Loss 20.5
(26.37)
Small vs. Small Win -19.7
(14.12)
Small vs. Small Draw –
Small vs. Small Loss -4.63
(6.16)
N 78 171 224 512
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
VIF, Uncentered 11.02 5.72 6.94
R² 0.514 0.417 0.285 0.523
Statistically significant: ***at 0.1% level; **at 1% level; *at 5% level.
† Results include club-fixed effects and are presented with robust standard errors. 
†† The log of the dependent variable produces results that do not differ statistically 
from those presented and demonstrate robustness in the dependent variable.
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some level of questionable decision making when allocating additional time at the end 
of close games.
Discussion and Conclusion
This analysis considers the determinants of additional time in the EPL from August 
2009 to May 2013 and questions whether home club and big club favoritism exist when 
referees allocate additional time at the end of each match. The number of goals scored, 
close matches, the number of yellow and red cards, the number of substitutes all in 
the second half, the number of goals between the teams at the end of 90 minutes, and 
second half serious injuries are all significant factors when explaining the amount of 
additional time referees allocate. We find no evidence of a bias favoring home teams 
when winning or losing, compared to drawn matches. Significantly more additional 
time is played when either team is winning. This result supports the recent findings of 
Riedl et al. (2015).
This investigation does confirm limited evidence of a bias towards big clubs over 
small clubs when additional time is allocated at the end of 90 minutes, a concept more 
commonly referred to as Fergie Time. Small clubs play significantly more time when 
winning at home against big clubs. No favoritism is found when considering matches 
between big clubs only and small clubs only. Referees officiating games involving big 
clubs only and small clubs only play significantly more additional time when one team 
leads at the end of 90 minutes of play. These findings again support by the work of Riedl 
et al. (2015). An examination of close matches confirms that neither home advantage 
nor Fergie Time are significant factors prevailing in these EPL matches. 
In line with Riedl et al. (2015), we report the presence of a bias, in some instances, 
towards the visiting team as reported in Regression (6). Both the Bundesliga, in the 
case of Riedl et al. (2015), and the EPL in this study do not report findings consistent 
with widespread home favoritism in the allocation of additional time. The results pre-
sented here are also consistent with the work of Rickman and Witt (2008), whose study 
addresses referee decision making during a timeframe of professional officiating in 
the EPL. The lack of evidence supporting home bias when allocating additional time 
supports the view that referee professionalism decreases the likelihood of home favor-
itism occurring. Further inspection of the data, differentiating between games in which 
margins are close (Reidl et al., 2015), or in which clubs of differential sizes compete 
(this study), can unearth alternative biases that are not visible from solely looking at 
home advantage. Thus, having professional officials may not absolve decision makers 
completely from what are arguably unconscious biases. 
We are cognizant of the limitations of this study. We collect data for only one Eu-
ropean competition. This limits the inferences that can be made from the results to 
football in general.9 Second, we realize that our instrument that establishes a taxonomy 
for club size is limited in its descriptive power as it establishes a strict dichotomy. We 
do not doubt that football club dominance occurs on a spectrum but believe the classi-
fication system adopted provides researchers a degree of empirical practicality and an 
efficient means to distinguish football club size. 
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Despite these limitations, the findings imply that further efforts could be made to 
eliminate any bias in the allocation of additional time. Several solutions could be con-
sidered to protect referee impartiality, ranging from greater information disclosure 
from FIFA to operational adjustments and rule changes. First, to ensure greater trans-
parency regarding exactly how additional time is allocated, FIFA could clarify Law 7. 
This law currently states that “an allowance [for additional time] is to be made only 
when these [stoppages] delays are excessive” (FIFA, 2014, p. 104).
This explanation is vague. All stakeholders could be provided with specific guidelines 
for the additional time allocated for yellow cards, red cards, goals, and other excessive 
stoppages. While we do not doubt that all of the instances warranting the inclusion of 
additional time will last for different time periods, disclosing more information of how 
officials are instructed to calculate additional time or the explicit statement of rules of 
thumb relating to the allocation of time could increase transparency.
While the empirical evidence presented here confirms only a limited problem, the is-
sue of any bias related to additional time could be reduced further by more fundamen-
tal operational changes. Stopping the match clock for events such as serious injuries (as 
is the case in other sports such as rugby union) or other lengthy stoppages (e.g., substi-
tutions) would eliminate the need for additional time. Upon reaching 90 minutes, the 
match would end once the final phase of play concluded. A more fundamental change 
could involve taking the task of timekeeping away from the referee. As an officiating 
task timekeeping is an accident of history. Allowing referees to officiate without the 
pressure of timekeeping or allocating additional time could reduce the pressure they 
are under from players, managers, and spectators. If an anonymous timekeeper were 
appointed, the potential influence that would be exerted by external parties such as 
players and managers on timekeeping decisions could be reduced. Given the limited 
evidence of referee bias such operational changes may not be required unless authori-
ties wished to reduce the existence of any favoritism, however limited. 
The introduction of additional time in 1891 and the 1998 innovation of the fourth 
official displaying the allocation have contributed greatly to a sense of fairness and 
transparency within football. Both were grounded-breaking decisions when first in-
troduced. We suggest that future research should focus on acquiring subsamples from 
competitions throughout Europe to test the hypotheses here.10 We purposefully apply 
a flexible criterion to allow future research to address the hypotheses under investiga-
tion here in alternative European competitions. 
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Endnotes
1 In particular, writers for The Guardian newspaper in the United Kingdom have featured the 
issue (Taylor, 2009; Campbell, 2013).
2 A review of the central findings from studies considering a range of sports is provided by Car-
ron, Loughhead, and Bray (2005) and Pollard and Pollard (2005). For a review of the variations 
in home advantage for football see Pollard (2006).
3 See Rickman and Witt (2008) for an outline of the reforms in the EPL for referee training ahead 
of the 2001–2002 season. 
⁴ This is an annual report produced by financial services firm Deloitte that profiles the highest 
earning clubs in world football.
⁵ Three competitions are considered “major”; the Premier League, FA Cup, and League Cup.
⁶ The 22 small clubs are Aston Villa, Birmingham City, Blackburn Rovers, Blackpool, Bolton 
Wanderers, Burnley, Everton, Fulham, Hull City, Newcastle United, Norwich City, Portsmouth, 
Queens Park Rangers, Reading, Southampton, Stoke City, Sunderland, Swansea, West Bromwich 
Albion, West Ham United, Wigan Athletic, and Wolverhampton Wanderers.
⁷ Some may argue Everton, Aston Villa, and Newcastle United should be classified as “big” clubs. 
A cumulative league table of the Premier League from 1992 to 2013 could support this view with 
Everton (6th), Aston Villa (7th), and Newcastle United (8th). However, this is deemed inappro-
priate as Manchester City, champions twice since 2012, is only 10th in the cumulative table, be-
hind Championship club Blackburn Rovers. Alternatively, it could be argued that success at the 
European level could have been used to determine club size. Aston Villa (1982 European Cup) 
and Everton (1985 European Cup Winners Cup) both enjoyed this success. Again, however, this 
approach is not used as success 30 or more years prior is not a relevant indictor of club perfor-
mance today, and due to the fact that Nottingham Forest, Ipswich Town, and West Ham United 
have all won European competitions, and suffered repeated relegations from the top division 
since. Furthermore, it has been more than 20 years since Everton or Aston Villa won a domestic 
trophy, and 60 years since Newcastle won a major honor.
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⁸ A serious injury is deemed to have occurred if the BBC match report cites a player sustaining a 
broken limb, receiving oxygen on the pitch from the medical staff, or a player unable to leave the 
field of play without assistance (e.g., stretcher required) following a period of medical attention.
⁹ Our results are in contrast to Scoppa (2008), who does provide evidence of home team favorit-
ism in the allocation of additional time for Serie A. Therefore, findings may differ across leagues 
and individual referees.
10 Replications of studies that address favoritism in football have produced results that do not 
corroborate original findings (Johnston, 2008).
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